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GILFILLAN V. CITY OF
PHILADELPHIA*
The establishment clause of the first amendment, made applicable to
the states via the fourteenth amendment,' states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion . ",2 This amend-
ment was adopted as a guard against religious persecution, an evil per-
ceived by the Founding Fathers to be intimately related to government
sponsorship of particular religious sects.' The establishment clause, how-
* This article is a student work prepared by Joseph J. Tesoriero, a member of the St. John's
Law Review and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-17 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940).
' U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
' See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-32 (1962); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-
14 (1947). See generally L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 115-21 (rev. ed. 1967).
The Everson opinion set forth the historical background of the establishment clause. Recog-
nized in Everson was the "turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large part by
established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy."
330 U.S. at 8-9. Particularly troublesome was the practice of taxing the citizenry in order to
support government-sponsored churches. Such practices led to the belief "that individual
religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power
to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions." Id. at 11. These considerations
led the Everson Court to interpret broadly the establishment clause, id. at 15, and sweep-
ingly state:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
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ever, has been interpreted to proscribe more than the establishment of an
official state religion. It has been broadly construed to preclude govern-
ment aid to any or all religions as well as government preference of one
religion over another.' Indeed, the state is prohibited from placing its
"stamp of approval"' upon any religious activity and must do no more
than maintain a "benevolent neutrality"' with respect to religious affairs.
Recently, in Gilfihlan v. City of Philadelphia7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that various expenditures made by the
City of Philadelphia in connection with Pope John Paul II's 1979 visit to
that city violated the establishment clause.'
When Pope John Paul II announced his intention to visit Philadel-
phia, city officials decided to construct a large platform at Logan Circle
for the Pope's use in conducting an outdoor Mass.9 Shortly after the city
announced its plans, the Gilfillan plaintiffs sought to enjoin it from pay-
ing for the platform on the ground that such action would violate the
establishment clause. To ensure timely construction, the Archdiocese of
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other. . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any reli-
gious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and state."
Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
Later cases have tempered the absolute statements of Everson, recognizing that not all
legislative programs respecting aid to religious institutions are prohibited by the Constitu-
tion. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
677-79 (1971). In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Court stated that "[t]he
considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in retro-
spect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear
in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general principles," id. at
668, and pointed to Everson as illustrative of the "hazards of placing too much weight on a
few words or phrases," id. at 670. More recently, the Supreme Court has acknowledged its
intent "to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches at either end of the range
of possible outcomes." Committee For Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 662 (1980).
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962).
* Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). See generally Giannella, Religious Lib-
erty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part H. The Nonestablishment Prin-
ciple, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 514-15 (1968).
7 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2322 (1981).
8 Id. at 928.
o Id. at 927. The Archdiocese did not request the city to construct the platform. Rather, the
city volunteered to build the platform with city funds. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1979, § 1, at 18,
col. 1.
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT
Philadelphia agreed to reimburse the city for the costs incurred should
the city eventually be adjudged to have impermissibly paid for the
platform."0
The city's design for the platform was approved by the archdiocese.
The finished cylindrical platform was 281/2-feet high and 144 feet in di-
ameter. Atop this main platform stood a smaller 14-foot high pyramid-
shaped platform, upon which an altar rested. Additionally, upon this pyr-
amid rested an even smaller five-step platform which supported the
throne to be used by the Pope."1
The platform cost the city approximately $310,000. This figure in-
cluded such related expenses as $48,000 for shrubs and flowers, and
$56,000 for sound equipment.1 2 Subtracting the cost of reusable items, the
cost was in excess of $204,000. The altar and Pope's chair were provided
by the Archdiocese."3 Moreover, twenty thousand reserve tickets to the
Mass were available through the archdiocese. Archdiocesan "marshalls"
handled the seating of reserve ticket holders on the day of the Mass."'
City officials did not accompany the Pope on the platform during the
Mass.
Opposing only the construction of the platform used for the Mass,
the plaintiffs did not challenge the city's construction of a platform used
by city and church officials to greet the Pope at the airport upon his
arrival, the expenditures for police protection, or the Pope's use of Logan
Circle, a public area, as a site for the Mass.'" The district court held that
the city's expenditure violated the establishment clause and ordered the
city to obtain reimbursement pursuant to its agreement with the
archdiocese."
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed.' Writing for a divided panel,
Judge Rosenn 5 reviewed the district court's application of the three-
pronged establishment clause inquiry' and determined that the city's ex-
penditure failed all aspects of the test.2 0 The court noted that the expen-
diture displayed a nonsecular legislative purpose,2' had an effect which
10 637 F.2d at 927.
I d.
See table of costs appended to the district court's opinion, 480 F. Supp. 1161, 1170-71
(E.D. Pa. 1979).
" 480 F. Supp. at 1162 n.1.
l" 637 F.2d at 932.
" Id. at 928.
1' 480 F. Supp. at 1166-69.
" 637 F.2d at 928.
Judge Rosenn was joined in his opinion by Judge Garth. Judge Aldisert dissented.
637 F.2d at 929-34.
20 Id.
" Id. at 929-30.
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primarily advanced religion,2 2 and fostered excessive government entan-
glement with religion.
23
The Gilfihlan court found an excessive entanglement arising from the
joint participation between the city and the archdiocese in planning the
construction of the platform.2 4 Judge Rosenn observed that the city offi-
cials responsible for preparations had counterparts in the archdiocese,
and that while the city alone designed the platform, the archdiocese ap-
proved the design. Furthermore, the archdiocese assumed government
functions by handling the sale of reserve tickets and by handling seating
access. Such joint preparation efforts, according to Judge Rosenn,
amounted to an impermissible entanglement of government and religious
authorities . 2 The Gilfillan court also affirmed the district court's alterna-
tive finding of entanglement based on the political divisiveness caused by
the expenditure.2 This divisiveness was found to be evidenced by the fact
that three separate parties had sought to enjoin the construction of the
platform.2 7
Judge Aldisert dissented, arguing that since the Pope was a visiting
head of a secular state, namely, Vatican City, the expenditure's purpose
and effect were primarily secular.2 8 Addressing the question of excessive
entanglement, Judge Aldisert asserted that the contacts between the city
and the archdiocese were not proven to have increased due to the con-
struction of the platform. He further stated that it should not have been
surprising that the archdiocese worked with the city, given the safety con-
cerns regarding the Pope's visit.2 9 Judge Aldisert also noted that the po-
litical divisiveness of the city's expenditure was diminished by its one-
time nature, and further added that the number of plaintiffs in an action
should not be a measure of political divisiveness.2 0
It is submitted that the entanglement test has become overly broad,
a trend both reflected and furthered by Gilfihlan. Indeed, the ease with
which a statute may be struck down under Gilfihlan's expanded entangle-
" Id. at 930-31.
" Id. at 931-32.
24 Id.
21 Id. at 932.
26 Id.
27 Id.
'8 Id. at 935-38 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
Id. at 940 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
30 Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The Gilfillan dissent argued that the majority's holding re-
quired the city to become entangled with religion. Judge Aldisert reasoned that since the
plaintiffs conceded that the platform constructed at the airport for the Pope did not violate
the establishment clause even though the Pope pronounced a blessing from it, the plaintiffs
were urging that the city or a court engage in making distinctions based on the religious
context of the various events in question. Such determinations would impermissibly embroil
the city in evaluations of religious matters. Id. at 940-41 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT
ment inquiry may edge the establishment clause doctrine closer to a con-
stitutionally intolerable hostility towards religion.
To effectuate the right to freely exercise one's religious beliefs, the
constitutional protection against support of religious activity has been
tempered by the proscription against government hostility towards reli-
gion."1 In fact, the United States Supreme Court has noted that "[w]e are
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. '3 2 To-
tal separation of church and state, the Supreme Court has further ob-
served, is not required by the first amendment." There exists, however, a
zone between the prohibitions against support of religious activity and
hostility towards religion in which concerted action between government
and religious authority is permissible." Defining the parameters of this
zone has been a most difficult task for American courts because the line
between neutrality towards religion and support of religion is often un-
clear.35 The search for meaningful criteria with which to implement this
constitutionally mandated neutrality has led the Supreme Court to for-
nulate a three-part test to be employed when determining whether any
particular government activity violates the establishment clause.
The three-part test dictates that in order for a statute to be consid-
ered nonviolative of the establishment clause (1) it must have a secular
3' Everson v. Board of Educ., 330.U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947); see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 672-73 (1970). In Everson, the Court stated that while the first amendment "requires
the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers, it
does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to
handicap religions than it is to favor them." 330 U.S. at 18. To illustrate its point, the Court
said that the first amendment does not require that public services such as police and fire
protection, connections for sewage disposal, and highways and sidewalks be withheld from
church schools. Id. at 17-18. Indeed, the Court's final holding was that it was constitution-
ally permissible for a state to pay the bus fares of parochial school children, insofar as this
was part of a program to pay the bus fares of all school children. Id. The Walz Court re-
marked that:
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely
straight line .... The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all
that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmen-
tally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those
expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive
of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without spon-
sorship and without interference.
397 U.S. at 669.
" Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
33 Committee For Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973).
31 Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-14
(1952).
18 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
242 (1968). In Lemon, the Court remarked, "[c]andor compels acknowledgment ... that we
can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of
constitutional law." 403 U.S. at 612.
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legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must not advance or
inhibit religion; and (3) it must not lead to excessive entanglement be-
tween government and religion."8 The establishment clause is violated if
any of these parts is not met." The often perplexing questions con-
fronting a tribunal attempting to determine a statute's purpose, effect on
religion, and degree of entanglement with religion it may foster renders
application of these criteria problematic."8
The entanglement test was first introduced by the Supreme Court as
an independent criterion for determining establishment clause violations
in Walz v. Tax Commission."9 The Walz Court was presented with a
question concerning the propriety of a property tax exemption for reli-
gious organizations. It held that an inquiry should be made "whether
[government] involvement [with religion] is excessive, and whether it is a
continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to
an impermissible degree of entanglement."4 0 Avoiding such involvement,
according to Walz, furthered the aim of "insulation and separation be;
tween church and state."'41 The Court upheld the exemption, holding that
it created only a minimal degree of involvement with religion."' Indeed,
Walz noted that the elimination of the exemption would expand govern-
ment involvement with religion through tax evaluations, tax liens, and tax
foreclosures.
4
The entanglement test, however, has not escaped critical comment.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Walz cautioned that there are
many forms of government-religion interaction which should not be held
violative of the establishment clause.44 Another Supreme Court Justice
has characterized the test as "insolubly paradoxical.' 4 Notwithstanding
such criticism, the entanglement test has become firmly established.4 6
'6 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975); Committee For Pub. Educ. & Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971).
" See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971).
38 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 242-43 (1968).
39 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
0 Id. at 675.
41 Id.
41 Id. at 676.
" Id. at 674.
44 Id. at 681 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
40 See, e.g., Committee For Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653
(1980) (aid to nonpublic schools); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675, (1970) (property
tax exemptions for religious organizations); Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73,
78 (1st Cir. 1979) (government subpoena of parochial school records); Bogen v. Doty, 598
F.2d 1110, 1113 (8th Cir. 1979) (prayer by guest clergyman at public county board meeting);
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT
Subsequent to Walz, the Supreme Court established additional criteria to
be applied in assessing the constitutional propriety of involvements be-
tween church and state in entanglement cases, thus encouraging a
broader application of the entanglement standard. One year after Walz,
the Supreme Court, in Lemon v. Kurtzman47 set forth three factors for
determining whether government had become excessively entangled with
religion. The Lemon Court stated, "we must examine the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that
the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the govern-
ment and the religious authority. '48 At issue in Lemon were Rhode Island
and Pennsylvania statutes which provided aid to parochial schools in the
form of salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects. 49 Applying its
newly promulgated factors to the facts presented, the Lemon Court found
that the "character of the institutions benefitted" were substantially reli-
gious, and therefore gave "rise to entangling church-state relationships." 50
The "nature of the aid" being salary supplements to teachers with a duty
to advance the religious mission of the school provided a further motive
for striking the legislation in question."1 Finally, the "resulting relation-
ship" was found to be an enduring one, contemplating continued state
surveillance of schools receiving aid to ensure that only secular subjects
were taught by teachers receiving such aid.52
It is submitted that the additional entanglement criteria enunciated
in Lemon essentially reiterate existing aspects of the three-part test. The
resulting relationship factor merely summarizes the entire entanglement
test as promulgated by Walz. 3 Analyzing the purpose of the institutions
aided and the form of the aid given is a reapplication of the primary-
effect test. Under the primary-effect test, a government program may
have the effect of impermissibly advancing religion if the aided institu-
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 553 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 433
U.S. 903 (1977) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 and regulation thereunder mandating reasonable
accommodation of religion); Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (government
sponsorship of civic Christmas pageant); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F.
Supp. 1291, 1310 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (investigation of alleged employment discrimination by
religious organization); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 558
P.2d 338, 342 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977) (erection of latin cross as war memo-
rial in public park).
47 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
' Id. at 615.
' Id. at 607-10. The Pennsylvania statute also included a program of reimbursement for
textbooks and instructional materials. Id. at 609.
60 Id. at 616.
SI Id. at 616-17.
B Id. at 619.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
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tion is pervasively sectarian.5" Thus, the nature of the aided institution is
scrutinized under both the effect test and the entanglement test's "char-
acter of the institution" factor. The form of the aid factor as employed in
Lemon duplicates the effect test because a key question raised by this
criterion concerned "the potential for impermissible fostering of reli-
gion." 55 Whether religion is "impermissibly fostered," it is suggested, is
essentially the same inquiry mandated by the effect test, one which seeks
to determine if religion is impermissibly advanced.5 Justice White's con-
currence in Lemon characterized the majority's reasoning as a "curious
and mystifying blend. '57 Indeed, the further proliferation of entangle-
ment criteria in Lemon, it is suggested, has served only to obscure the
meaning of the entanglement standard, as well as other aspects of the
three-pronged test. Moreover, by duplicating in the entanglement test de-
terminations already made in other components of the three-part estab-
lishment clause inquiry, a situation is created where violations of one test
will invariably become violations of another. This will cloud the meaning
of each criterion.5" The potential confusion engendered by this overlap-
ping approach is reflected by Gilfillan. The Gilfihlan court found exces-
sive entanglement to exist despite the absence of an enduring administra-
tive involvement, mandating continuing scrutiny of the religious entity in
question. 59 Indeed, Gilfillan's broad interpretation of the entanglement
test is evidenced by its failure to address adequately the problem of
whether the one-time expenditure by Philadelphia ever rose to the degree
of entanglement considered excessive by Walz and its progeny. 60 Contacts
11 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973);
see Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680-87 (1971).
" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
" See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 665 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), where the dissent analyzed the form of the aid in deciding
whether the statute in question had the effect of advancing religion or fostering excessive
government entanglement with religion.
'7 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 666 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
See Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 769 (1976) (White, J., concur-
ring). Justice White argued in his concurring opinion that:
In affirming the District Court's conclusion that the legislation here does not create
an "excessive entanglement" of church and state, the plurality emphasizes with ap-
proval that "the District Court gave dominant importance to the character of the
aided institutions...." Yet [this is] the same [factor] upon which the plurality fo-
cuses in concluding that the Maryland legislation satisfies the second part of the
Lemon I test: that on the record the "appellee colleges are not 'pervasively sectarian'
I see no reason to indulge in the redundant exercise of evaluating the same facts
and findings under a different label.
Id. at 769 (White, J., concurring).
'9 Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 930-31 (3d Cir. 1980).
60 Judge Rosenn briefly acknowledged that the short-term nature of the city's expenditure
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between church and state which have been held to be excessive entangle-
ments have been of an enduring, recurring nature, necessitating continu-
ing surveillance of a religious organization."s Clearly, the expenditure in
Gilfillan was not recurring, and did not give rise to an enduring relation-
factually distinguished Gilillan from the long-term aid questioned in Lemon. Id. at 932. He
asserted, however, that there was no reason to believe that the short-term involvement in
Gilfillan could not result in excessive entanglement. Id. The notable absence in Gil/lllan of
a recurring, continuous involvement of the type which formed the gravamen of the Supreme
Court's discussion of entanglement in Walz and Lemon, however, suggests that Gilfillan's
application of the entanglement and divisiveness standards may be questionable. The en-
tanglement and divisiveness inquiries, it is submitted, contemplate the existence of endur-
ing administrative involvements entailing scrutiny and surveillance of a religious entity.
Furthermore, to find divisiveness, it must be determined that there exists the potential for
internecine political discord along religious lines. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372
(1975). Meek is indicative of the factual context typically implicating the consideration of
the entanglement and divisiveness criteria. Meek involved the propriety of a Pennsylvania
program which provided to qualifying nonpublic elementary and secondary schools text-
books and certain auxiliary services including counseling, testing, psychological services,
speech and hearing therapy, and related services for exceptional, remedial or educationally
disadvantaged students. Id. at 351-54. In striking down all but the textbook loan provision,
the Court not only emphasized the unacceptable administrative entanglement which would
result if the plan were implemented, but also recognized that the enduring nature of the
program guaranteed repeated confrontation between opponents and proponents of the legis-
lation, thereby creating the potential for political divisiveness. Id. at 372. The Court then
concluded:
This potential for political entanglement, together with the administrative entangle-
ment which would be necessary to ensure that auxiliary-services personnel remain
strictly neutral and nonideological when functioning in church-related schools, com-
pels the conclusion that Act 194 violates the constitutional prohibition against laws
"respecting an establishment of religion."
Id.
In Gilfiflan, it is suggested, there existed no potentially enduring or long-term adminis-
trative involvements compelling a constitutionally intolerable entanglement or surveillance
of the religious entity in question. Additionally, the possibility of an annually repeated, po-
litically divisive confrontation between opponents and proponents of the expenditure rising
to the level of that contemplated in Meek did not exist.
61 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970); see, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 67g (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1971). In Tilton, the Court upheld one-time federal con-
struction grants to church-related colleges, striking only the part of the statute which re-
moved after 20 years the restriction that any structure built with federal funds be used for
only a secular purpose. 403 U.S. at 683. The Tilton Court found no excessive entanglements
due to the one-time nature of the grant, and the lessened need to monitor college level
institutions of learning. Id. at 685-88; see Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S.
736, 763 (1976). In Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, the Court up-
held a state plan to reimburse private schools for costs incurred in administering state-
mandated standardized tests. The Regan Court found no excessive entanglements because
the routine manner in which the reimbursement plan was administered did not entail con-
tinued surveillance of the private schools. 444 U.S. at 659-60.
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ship between church and state which would require surveillance and con-
stant scrutiny by the city.6 2 Gilfilan's reliance upon Allen v. Morton63 as
support for its determination that collaboration between the city and the
archdiocese led to excessive entanglement appears misplaced. 4 In Mor-
ton, excessive entanglement was found to exist because government offi-
cials played an active role in managing an annually held Christmas pag-
eant supported by federal funds." Gilfihlan failed to recognize that in
Morton the questionable involvement by the government officials was re-
curring and the funds were appropriated annually, s thus giving rise to
the type of entanglement and potential divisiveness proscribed by Lemon.
Additionally, the Morton court stated that permissible involvement could
entail government aid in the form of labor and equipment for "the con-
struction and disassembly of the noncreche aspects of the pageant. 67 Gil-
fillan appears to indicate, however, that joint preparation of a single
event by church and state can result in excessive entanglement. It is sub-
mitted that this result is not contemplated by the entanglement test.
While a single expenditure by government could violate the establish-
ment clause," the entanglement test seeks only to prohibit enduring rela-
62 See note 60 and accompanying text supra. See also note 64 and accompanying text infra.
63 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
64 In Morton, the District of Columbia Circuit determined that participation in an annually
held Christmas pageant was constitutionally impermissible in that: (1) various government
officials played an active role in the management and organization of the pageant, actually
occupying two of the five positions on the pageant's Executive Committee, and (2) the gov-
ernment "cosponsored" the pageant by providing labor and assistance in assembling, dis-
mantling, and restoring of the pageant area. Id. at 70. The Christmas Pageant of Peace, Inc.,
however, bore the cost of the electricity used to light a creche which was part of the display.
Id.
Notably, the Morton court, in its discussion of excessive entanglement acknowledged
that the government's involvement in the pageant amounted to "considerably less than the
constant surveillance and interference discussed in Lemon." Id. at 75. Further, the court
observed that, "the involvement we consider here today is novel in terms of Supreme Court
precedent and thus does not fit well in the pigeonholes of past decisions." Id. Nevertheless,
the Morton court held that the government's involvement resulted in excessive entangle-
ment. Id. The court reasoned that its application of the entanglement standard was based
upon the principle that government involvenent with religion should be kept to a "neces-
sary minimum." Id. In Gilfillan, however, there were no annual, recurring involvements.
Similarly, absent in Gilfillan was the awkwardness of government personnel functioning vis-
ibly as cosponsors of a clearly nonsecular function. In light of Morton's candid acknowledge-
ment that its application of the entanglement test was precedentially uncertain, it is sub-
mitted that Gilfillan's application of that test under facts displaying an even more tenuous
basis for entanglement is similarly questionable.
65 Id. at 70.
66 Id. at 69.
67 Id. at 75.
66 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689-90 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also
Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879
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tionships between church and state.
Gilfihlan's questionable expansion of the entanglement test is further
evidenced by its affirmation of the district court's finding of political divi-
siveness as an alternative basis for holding that the City of Philadelphia
had become excessively entangled with religion."9 Noting that political di-
vision along religious lines was a threat to the political process and an evil
which the first amendment was intended to prevent, the Lemon Court
stated that such political division constituted a "broader base of entan-
glement of yet a different character. 7 0 The potential for political divi-
siveness, however, is not a factor which by itself can serve as the basis for
finding an establishment clause violation.7 1 Indeed, in Roemer v. Mary-
land Public Works Board,"7 the Supreme Court, after carefully detailing
the criteria to be examined in determining whether excessive entangle-
ment exists, indicated that the impact of all factors, including divisive-
ness, must be assessed cumulatively." A trend can be detected, however,
to render this factor decisive in establishment clause disputes. In Wol-
man v. Walter,74 Justices Brennan and Marshall stated that the potential
for political divisiveness engendered by the Ohio aid-to-parochial-schools
program in issue could alone invalidate the aid package. 75 Additionally,
the means by which the Gilfillan court arrived at its determination of
divisiveness appear debatable. Apparently, the Gilfillan panel based its
finding of divisiveness on the fact that three separate groups brought suit
(1973). Anderson concerned the propriety of the presence on city-county property of a gran-
ite monolith inscribed with the Ten Commandments, the Star of David, and other religious
symbols. The expense of installation and maintenance of the monolith was incurred by the
city and county. Id. at 30. The court held that the erection and maintenance of the monolith
was not constitutionally proscribed, finding that the monolith was a secular monument
which did not advance religion. Id. at 34. Since the entanglement test was not even dis-
cussed, it is submitted that a mere expenditure for religion should not compel the applica-
tion of the entanglement test absent the presence of an enduring relationship between gov-
ernment and religious authority.
This Comment does not dispute Gilfillan's findings of a religious purpose and effect.
While legitimate arguments may be raised concerning the Pope as a secular head of state,
Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d at 935-36 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), a Mass is a
religious event, celebrated for a religious purpose. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1979, § 2, at 15,
col. 4 (comment of Rev. William Helmick of Archdiocese of Boston, in regard to city ex-
penditures for the Pope's visit to Boston).
"' Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 932 (3d Cir. 1980).
70 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
" Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973);
Bogen v. Doty, 598 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1979).
'2 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
73 Id. at 766.
" 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
78 Id. at 256 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 259 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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to enjoin the city's expenditure for the platform." It is submitted that a
tribunal cannot accurately assess the degree of divisiveness created by
government involvement with religion by merely examining the number
of parties in the action. Although the existence of litigation regarding a
particular matter may demonstrate controversy between the parties in-
volved, it is suggested that the broad-based political discord identified by
the Supreme Court as implicating constitutional considerations contem-
plates a deeper division than can be shown by the existence of litigation
alone. 77
CONCLUSION
The evolution and expansion of the entanglement test as a critical
factor in establishment clause cases requires that the limits of its applica-
tion be more precisely defined in order to avoid results approaching im-
permissible hostility towards religion. Yet, Gilfillan presents the possibil-
ity that even formerly permissible, routine contacts between church and
state may be deemed constitutionally impermissible should the involve-
ment become the subject of a dispute within the Third Circuit's broad
interpretation of divisiveness. It is suggested, therefore, that the entangle-
ment test serve only to limit government involvement with religion that is
of an enduring nature, necessitating continued surveillance to a degree
which casts government in the role of a watchdog over religious activity.
It is hoped that Gifihlan does not further expand an already nebulous
entanglement test.
71 Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 932 (3d Cir. 1980).
71 See Bogen v. Doty, 598 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1979).
